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All C anadian lawyers know that we inherited our Common 
Law rules o f real property from England and know equally that 
radical changes and reforms were made in this branch o f the law 
in England about half a century ago.1 No such sweeping changes 
have taken place here and indeed it is correct to conclude that we 
have a veritable museum o f rules which as nowhere else reflects 
the great historical background o f the English feudal system. Almost 
any C anadian law student can talk with some comprehension o f the 
niceties o f primer seisin and other assorted oddments. It is still of 
some importance, in this province at least, to know where we get 
the apparently ridiculous rules. An Australian o r New Zealander, 
and even the odd American, while silently chuckling over our 
system, longs to come and be immersed for a while in our doctrines, 
for nowhere else can they be found extant. Such stalwarts as the 
Rule in Shelley’s Case, the Doctrine o f W orthier Title o r the Rule 
in Whitby v. Mitchell, to mention only a few, stand proudly forth 
in our jurisprudence along with the almost never-questioned giants 
o f the Statutes o f Uses and Enrollments. It is almost as though we 
have a panoram a o f the past that is nourished, cherished and indeed 
revered; there is also the possibility that there is a degree o f apathy. 
G rand reform o f certain facets o f our legal lives is no doubt possible 
and indeed has been accomplished. However, apart from occasional 
substantial and enlightened excursions into the exotic areas of 
perpetuities and trusts, the fact o f life is simple: reform by statute 
o f the rules of real property law is not politically viable; nobody 
much cares.
With this background therefore, it could seem that a discussion 
of possible reform is a waste of time. At this juncture it probably 
is. That is, it is on a grand scale. There is no question but that 
sweeping reform is necessary and one would find few to quarrel 
with this conclusion. One would find the same num ber sufficiently
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interested to  undertake the monum ental task it is. The burden o f 
this article then is two-fold:
The first is to remind those interested in the law o f real property 
o f this province o f some o f the problems inherent in our statutes as 
they now exist and the second is to suggest a half-dozen changes in 
our com m on law that might be considered as desirable to be effected 
on a statutory base. The number o f possibilities in both o f these 
topics is legion. The reader will be able to dredge from his own 
mind many others. The writer wishes only to m ention and discuss 
a few. The purpose is clearly to highlight and perhaps thereby to 
serve as an  example o f the larger work that needs to be done on a 
more serious base. If  this article has only a catalytic effect it will have 
done more than  the writer dares hope.
The obvious place o f beginning for a look at present statutory 
law on real property is the Property Act itself.2 Remembering that 
in this first phase we are looking for errors in the existing legislation, 
there is no question that the most often questioned section is sec­
tion 18.3 D on’t be immediately disdainful because the first two words 
of that section are “ Estates tail” . Please don’t leave now with the 
thought that here is another professor on the loose with nothing 
more to do than pick bones. It is, o f course, true that those words 
are followed by others which purport to sound the death knell o f 
the fee tail. It is submitted that there are two problems here which 
still need close scrutiny and one o f them, it is further subm itted, 
makes the use o f the fee tail in New Brunswick today very much 
a possible tool. To dispose first o f the constructional problem. 
Most form er students o f real property will remember that the fee 
tail grew from the fee simple conditional and served as a very useful 
vehicle for land transfer and holding for a very long time. The free 
alienability o f land eventually won out o f course, and provided the 
raison d'etre for this section. As with so many legislative enact­
ments, pressure o f time and the persuasion o f convenience led the 
draftsmen to lift the section rather than draft it. The hazards o f 
this are always present however, and in this case proved to lead 
to a very odd situation. The fact that the draftsm an’s brother in 
Nova Scotia made the same error (or perhaps the route was more 
circuitous) is no longer a salve as Nova Scotia has at least altered 
its section.4 In short, when the time came to  do away with the fee
2 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 177.
3 Estates tail are abolished, and every estate which would hitherto have been 
adjudged a fee tail shall be adjudged a fee simple; and if no valid remainder 
is limited thereon, shall be a fee simple absolute, and may be conveyed or 
devised by the tenant in tail, or otherwise shall descend to his heirs as a 
fee simple.
4 See infra.
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tail, the State o f New Y ork had already made the move. W hat 
easier method o f law reform  is there than to benefit from another’s 
efforts? So New Brunswick took the New Y ork section and it still 
stands in our legislation. The problem o f course is that the lifter 
didn’t read the rest o f the New Y ork statute. Cast a  glance back 
for a  m om ent a t section 18. In essence, it says that the fee tail is 
abolished and if a fee tail is attem pted it autom atically is changed to 
a fee simple. Then it concludes that this is to be a fee simple absolute 
where no valid rem ainder is limited on the fee tail. Two problems 
immediately arise. W hat happens if a valid rem ainder is limited 
on the fee tail and what difference does it make anyway because 
the com m on law o f real property in all its precision has declared 
unequivocally that there can never be a rem ainder o f any kind after 
any kind o f fee simple—absolute or otherwise. New York had solved 
these problems by a further provision o f its Act whereby “ . . .  such 
remainder shall be valid as a contingent lim itation on a fee . . 
There is no question that the New Brunswick provision in its present 
form makes no sense and whether one is prepared to deny the 
efficacy o f the fee tail today or not it obviously needs to  be changed. 
It should be remembered that the words o f the section have been 
litigated with the result that the Supreme C ourt o f Canada (in 
considering the Nova Scotia version5) was content to accept the 
earlier Nova Scotia decision6 that the words qualifying the change 
from fee tail to fee simple were meaningless.
If, however, as will probably be the case, the section is left as 
it is, an interesting and perhaps practical use of the fee tail as dis­
posed o f by this provision can be made when it is considered along 
with section 31 o f the Wills Act.7
This section, like the following one, deals with the problem 
of lapse and if one considers for a m om ent section 32 it will be 
noticed that there where a child, brother or sister o f a testator to 
whom real property had been devised, dies prior to the testator 
and has left issue living a t the date o f death o f the latter then no 
lapse takes place. It is clear tha t this saving only takes effect in 
the restrictive circumstances set forth o f relationship to the testator 
within fairly narrow bounds. When one shifts to a dissection of 
section 31 however a different set o f circumstances is present. There, 
where a testator has devised real property to X in fee tail and X has 
predeceased the testator (but leaves issue) and such issue are in 
turn still alive at the date of death o f the testator, then again no 
lapse takes place. Two restricting and interconnecting results flow
5 Ernst v. Zwicker (1897), 27 S.C.R. 594.
6 Re Simpson (1863), 5 N .S.R. 317.
7 (1959), 8 Eliz. II, c. 15 (N.B.).
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from this section. The first is that lapse is defeated here regardless 
o f degree o f relationship to the testator and second it becomes 
obvious that such a result can only be imagined if fee tail has a 
scintilla juris.
To put it as succinctly as possible then, a solicitor drawing a 
will and wishing to prevent any possibility o f lapse (as far as is 
humanly possible, that is) could so plan the desires o f his client as 
to make a devise to a person not fitting within section 32 and do 
so by the addition only o f the words “ in fee tail” . Considering the 
effects o f this under both section 31 o f the Wills Act and section 18 
o f the Property Act the result apparently is this: under the former 
section there is no question that a devise to A in fee tail (o r to A 
and the heirs o f his body) is a devise that “ would have been, under 
the law o f England, an estate tail” . Section 31 then performs its 
service o f preventing lapse and the devisee’s estate for some degree 
o f time at least has a fee tail. It would appear that immediately 
section 18 o f the Property Act fastens on this and the estate tail 
is to be “adjudged a fee simple” . The com bination o f course is 
clear. It may not be too far-fetched then to suggest to solicitors 
involved in will-drafting that this anom aly o f our law does offer 
a vehicle which in certain cases may be useful to effect the desires 
o f some clients. The conclusion can be stated shortly. If any change 
is proposed in the way o f reform ation o f the Property Act, section 18 
might well be a proper place to begin. Such an am endm ent would 
not, o f course, alter the possible usefulness o f the com bination o f 
the Wills Act and the Property Act as discussed above.
The second suggested change in the existing provisions of the 
Property Act concerns section 11 and in particular subsection (3) 
thereof which provides that “ In a conveyance, it is not necessary 
in the lim itation o f an estate in fee simple to use the word ‘heirs’, 
but it is sufficient if the words ‘in fee simple’ are used” . The original, 
common law, requirement, o f course, was that any inter vivos con­
veyance o f the fee simple in order to be valid had to contain the 
“ magic words” : “ and his heirs” . Failure to do so resulted at most 
in the creation o f a life tenancy in the grantee. This subsection then 
does have the merit o f enlarging this stricture by making it possible 
to convey the fee simple in an alternative manner. The fact remains, 
however, that outside these two methods, to which strict adherence 
is required, no creation o f a fee simple in a grantee is possible. A 
great many jurisdictions have altered this to align the method o f 
conveying inter vivos with testam entary transactions. It will be 
remembered that in the latter case failure to include any words o f 
lim itation in the devise o f real property is not a fatal error on the 
part o f the testator and unless a contrary intention is evidenced 
in the will the fee simple will pass to the devisee if the testator
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himself was possessed of that estate when he died. It is submitted 
that no reasonable case can now be made for a different require­
ment in the law o f conveyancing and that a section similar to that 
in use in other Canadian provinces8 should be enacted in subsitu- 
tion for section 11 (3) o f the Property Act.
The third possible change to be considered lies in section 8. 
This section, designed to remove the rigors of a failing interest in 
the nature o f a contingent remainder, does not do all that it should 
or could. The history o f the contingent rem ainder is shortly told 
and all we need remind ourselves o f here is that at the common 
law a contingent rem ainder in freehold is subject to destruction 
where the preceding estate o f freehold (on which it must be hinged) 
has come to an end and can no longer support it. Under this rule 
then where an estate is limited to a wife for her life and the remainder 
is to go to such children o f the testator as reach 21 years of age (the 
testator dying before any children reach that age) the contingent 
remainder in the children is open to  destruction if a t the time their 
m other dies they have not fulfilled the condition; the reversion 
(attached to all contingent remainders) then works and the title 
reverts to the estate of the testator. A similar result flows at the 
common law if for any reasons other than death the estate o f the
8 E. G. The Ontario provision (R.S.O., 1960, c. 66) reads as follows:
5(1) In a conveyance, it is not necessary, in the limitation of an 
estate in fee simple, to use the word “ heirs".
(2) For the purpose o f such limitation it is sufficient in a 
conveyance to use the words “in fee simple” or any other words 
sufficiently indicating the limitation intended.
(3) Where no words o f limitation are used, the conveyance 
passes all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand that 
the conveying parties have in, to, or on the property conveyed, 
or expressed or intended so to be, or that they have power to 
convey in, to or on the same.
(4) Subsection 3 applies only if and as far as a contrary intention 
does not appear from the conveyance, and has effect subject to the 
terms o f the conveyance and to the provisions therein contained.
(5) This section applies only to conveyance made after the 
1st day o f July, 1886.
Nova Scotia has an even simpler formula 
Section 2 (2) provides:
2 (2) A conveyance does not require a habendum or any special 
form o f words, terms o f art or words o f limitation, 
and in Section 5
(5) Except where a contrary intention appears by the 
conveyance,
(a) where words o f limitation are not used, the convey­
ance conveys the whole property right that the party conveying 
had power to dispose of by the conveyance, including, in the 
case o f real property, the fee simple;
R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 56.
6 U.N.B. LA W  JOURNAL
preceding life tenant comes to an end, as by merger, forfeiture, etc. 
The rule was harsh; the contingent remainder in freehold could not 
exist as such without the preceding freehold interest remaining 
intact; seisin was the reason. Section 8 o f the Property Act was 
designed to substantially alter this position in providing that even 
if the preceding life estate determined before the rem ainder vested, 
no destruction would take place but only if that life estate came to 
an end through “ forfeiture, surrender o r merger” . Forfeiture won’t 
bother us much any more, surrender or merger may. This leaves, it 
is submitted, two areas in which destruction is still possible: natural 
term ination o f the preceding life estate (through death o f the life 
tenant) and disclaimer. As to the latter it can only be assumed that 
omission of this category from section 8 was an error. The section 
is patterned on the English Real Property Act o f 1845,9 which 
resulted a few years later in the Contingent Rem ainder Act of 
! 877.10 The latter Act apparently cured the defect by adding dis­
claimer to the list extant now in section 8 o f the New Brunswick 
Act.11
Unfortunately, destruction o f contingent remainders by removal 
o f the preceding freehold by natural termination (e.g., death o f the 
life tenant), is a more tortuous tale. The passage o f the Statute o f 
Uses should have cured this defect, o r at least made it possible to 
be cured, provided the right process o f raising a use (or using an 
executory devise) was invoked. In other words, once it became 
possible to have springing executory limitations, the death o f the 
life tenant prior to vesting of the contingent remainder should have 
moved the fee into the estate o f the grantor (or testator) until the 
condition happened (say, coming o f age of the remainderman) and 
then it should have sprung out o f the former into the latter. This 
was one o f the great and far reaching results o f the Statute o f Uses. 
Such a result was not to be however because o f the strict rule put 
forward in Purefoy v. Rogers,12 In establishing this now famous 
rule the court was all too clear in pointing out that where a limitation 
could be construed to be either an executory interest o r a contingent 
remainder it must fall into the latter class. Shortly then, natural 
termination still (as long as Purefoy v. Rogers remains with us) 
destroys unvested contingent remainders. While subtle devices can 
be employed to circumvent the rule (mainly by so wording the 
conveyance that no possibility exists o f classification as a contingent 
remainder, as a limitation to the wife for life and one day later to 
those children attaining 21 years o f age—a contingent remainder
9 Real Property Act (1845), 8 &  9 Viet., c. 106, s. 8. (Imp.).
10 Contingent Remainders Act (1877), 40 & 41 Viet., c. 33 (Imp.).
11 See Laskin, Cases and Notes on Land Law  (Toronto, 1958), p. 348.
12 (1671), 2 Wms. Saund. 380; 85 E.R. 1181.
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in  the children here being impossible as the rule that a contingent 
remainder must vest at o r before the term ination o f the preceding 
life estate is run afoul of) it should be possible by more modern, 
legislative means to cure this defect. The second English statute 
mentioned earlier13 had this effect. Only one C anadian province, 
Prince Edward Island, has followed suit.14 It is now subm itted that 
along with a few o f the o ther old gems of the history o f real property 
law to be looked at shortly, Purefoy v. Rogers has got to go and 
the Property Act o f this Province should be amended accordingly. 
It would be appropriate if a new subsection (2) were added to 
section 8 to contain the same basic provision as tha t now in existence 
in Prince Edward Island.
A minor change in subsection (1) o f section 10 is suggested 
as well. The opening words o f the section state that “ A feoffment 
made after the first day o f July, 1904, is void at law unless evidenced 
by d e e d ; . . . ” . The writer heard a distinguished lawyer o f this 
Province once argue (without specifically referring to this section) 
that conveyance o f real property by feoffment had been abolished. 
This misconstruction o f the provision o f this section is easily assumed. 
There is no question that a deed is a prerequisite to a valid inter 
vivos conveyance today. This is not to say however, that this has 
short-circuited one o f  the former major methods o f alienation of 
land. It is still possible to convey by feoffment, so long as this 
procedure is followed by a deed. It is submitted, o f course, that as 
the deed does the jo b  by itself (basically by the provisions o f the 
previous section wherein it is categorically stated that a conveyance 
o f the immediate freehold lies “ in grant as well as in livery” 15), no 
person would ever consider adding the burden o f a livery. We must 
be careful however, not to go too far. The English Law o f Property 
Act o f 1925, in section 51, abolished conveyances “ by livery or livery 
and seisin, o r by feoffment or by bargain and sale” . There is a valid 
argum ent, in New Brunswick, for abolishing feoffment, and it is 
submitted that this should be done by amending section 10, but 
let us not go too far and abolish the convevance by bargain and sale; 
at least not yet. So long as we have the Statute o f Uses in effect, 
the results, mainly in conveyancing, future interests and trusts, 
achieved by application o f that Statute can only be invoked in 
such a circumstance as where a use has been raised and a bargain 
and sale transaction is one of the major methods o f raising a use. 
A complete new Property Act is necessary to dispense with the
13 Note 10, supra.
14 R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 138.
15 9(2) All corporal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the con­
veyance o f the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as 
well as in livery.
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Statute o f Uses and no one would recommend arbitrary repeal o f 
it w ithout complete study and overhaul o f all our property legisla­
tion. Until that happy day arrives we must be extremely careful in 
our patchwork.
One very small point remains in this first part o f this article 
on proposed changes in the existing legislation. This concerns sec­
tion 43. In subsection (1), a mortgagee is required, when exercising 
the power of sale granted in the preceding section, to abide by certain 
rules calculated to advise the m ortgagor o f his impending move. 
Three clauses follow the adm onition to the mortgagee, viz. he must 
do “ (a); o r (b); and (c).” It may be picayune to question what is 
apparently straight forward but the writer wishes to know if it 
would be satisfactory to do just “ (a)” or must he do “ (a)” and “ (c)” ? 
To put it in simpler, more dram atic form , if I am invited to a party 
and asked to bring (a) a bottle o f scotch; or (b) a bottle o f rum ; 
and (c) a bottle o f brandy, do I satisfy my host by bringing the 
Scotch (or the rum and brandy) or must I bring the Scotch or rum, 
and the brandy? Do I therefore, as a mortgagee, fulfill my obliga­
tions by advising the m ortgagor under clause (a) and then relax, 
o r may I do otherwise and adopt, as an alternative, advertisement 
under clause (b) and (c), o r must I abide by either (a) or (b) and 
then do (c) as well? It is submitted that an argument could be made 
(perhaps not all that seriously) for any of these. If this is correct, 
a mortgagee can satisfy the statute by doing (a) alone, o f course. 
It is suggested therefore, that any heavy am endm ent to this Act 
should include a restatement o f this section so as to make this more 
clear; a tabular form of construction may perhaps provide the 
easiest solution.
Turning now to the second area for discussion outlined above, 
namely, that o f suggested changes in our common law that might 
be made on a statutory base for the first time in this Province, one 
o f  the most “ popular” reforms brought up from time to time 
concerns the Rule in Shelley’s Case. A commonly accepted state­
ment of the Rule would proceed like this: Where an estate of free­
hold is given to a person and in the same will o r deed an estate 
is given either mediately or immediately to his heirs (or the heirs 
o f his body) and both are legal or both equitable, it is a rule o f law 
that the word “ heirs” (or “ heirs of his body” ) is a word of limitation 
and not o f purchase. Accordingly, in a conveyance to A for life 
and remainder to A’s heirs, instead o f A and A’s heirs each taking 
an estate, as one would have thought, A receives, under the Rule, 
a life estate and the remainder in fee and then the doctrine o f merger 
works to give A a fee simple absolute. (It is perhaps worthwhile to 
remind ourselves here that, unlike many have assumed, the Rule, 
by itself, did not give A the fee simple absolute but only the limita­
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tion to A’s heirs and gave that interest to A so that any intervening 
freehold—say a life estate in B —would prevent immediate merger.) 
Leaving aside the reasons for the Rule (none o f which really per­
tains anymore) it should be noticed that the application o f it does 
not depend on any intent o f grantor or testator, it is truly a rule 
o f law. This is one o f the harsher components o f the Rule for while 
intention may be looked at to determine who the grantor o r testator 
had in mind, once the determ ination was made that the conditions 
fitted the Rule no statement, however categorical, o f intent, could 
vary the result.
While one can escape the limitations on conveyancing presented 
by the Rule, as by ensuring that the life interest and the remainder 
differ in that one is legal and the other equitable, or by giving A 
(in the example above) a leasehold interest, say for 99 years, there 
are obvious inhibitions to such moves. There is no question that 
this is one o f the relics of the past which no longer has any reason 
for remaining and should be done away with. Legislation is the 
only really effective way to do this. Courts have been trying to do 
it on their own at least since 1769 when Lord Mansfield attem pted 
it in Perrin v. Blake.Xb No Canadian Province has as yet done away 
with it although there is at least a possibility that Alberta has 
succeeded by the ruling in Re Simpson.17) England, in its reform 
legislation referred to earlier, abolished it for all instruments coming 
into operation after 1925. The provision to accomplish this can be 
very simple, a statement that what was the effect o f the Rule, that 
the word “ neirs” was a word of limitation, now is to be considered 
as a word of purchase.
A situation in conveyancing often confused with the Rule in 
Shelley’s Case, the so-called Doctrine of W orthier Title, should 
be mentioned here as well. This is another relic o f the past which, 
it is submitted, should be done away with. Under the D octrine,18 
when a conveyance (or testam entary disposition) consisted o f a 
limitation by O to A for life with a remainder to O ’s heirs, then 
the remainder in the heirs was transformed into a reversion in O. 
Today, this situation would more probably arise in that case where 
a grantor, A, sets up a trust whereby the trustee is required to pay 
the income therefrom to A for life and upon A's death to convey 
the property to A’s heirs. The attem pted remainder (contingent and 
equitable, o f course) in A’s heirs is again changed under the Doctrine 
to a reversion in A. The interests under the Doctrine of W orthier
16 (1769), I Wm. Bl. 672; 96 E.R. 392.
17 [1927J 4 D.L.R. 817.
18 The name of this doctrine arose because o f its application to a situation 
which can no longer exist as well as to the situation outlined hereunder 
which does remain.
10 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
Title then are always taken away from the heirs and given to the 
ancestor. The com bination o f these two, the Rule in Shelley’s case 
and the Doctrine o f W orthier Title, have, because they obviously 
encompass such a wide spectrum o f possible lim itations to rem ainder­
men, held sway for a  period and m anner totally inconsistent with 
their initial stature. There is no question but that they are traps for 
the unwary; even the wary stumble. Intent is obviously defeated; 
a grantor who has entered into a conveyance by which he assumes 
that he has effectively divested himself o f all but a life interest will 
find that he possesses the reversion as well and, most im portant, 
this is open to attachm ent by his creditors. He can, o f course, (if he 
realizes during his lifetime w hat he has done) leave the reversion 
to his heirs in his will and accomplish what he originally set out to 
do ; the problem arises because this realization alm ost never comes 
while he is alive. Failure to recognize the trap  will result in most 
cases therefore on the interest falling into the grantor’s residuary 
estate. Like the suggested legislative approach to Shelley, the solu­
tion is simple: the Doctrine can be dispensed with by a short, succinct 
statement (in the Property Act) to the effect that a remainder to the 
heirs o f a grantor is to remain as that and not to result in a reversion 
in the grantor.
Thirdly, another o f the old ghosts still haunting is the Rule 
in Whitby v. Mitchell w In its simplest form, where a life estate 
was given to A, remainder for life to his eldest son and remainder 
in fee to his sons and their heirs and A had no son at the date of 
the conveyance, then the remainder in fee was void. A was alright 
as he was alive and could take the present interest, his son was 
alright, possessing a valid (contingent, o f course) life estate but the 
further unborn remaindermen were thought to be just too far away. 
While mitigated by the courts to some extent by the Cy-Pres Doc­
trine,20 this was not o f much help and the Rule was done away 
with in England in the 1925 sweep. It forms one o f the trilogy, with 
the two above-discussed relics, o f traps which still wander aimlessly 
through our reports. No greater need for it exists than for the others 
and it is submitted again that it can be legislated out in short order. 
Failure to move here is not o f such pressing importance however 
as the Rule against Perpetuities apparently will handle most o f the 
problems arising here in any event.
Many people (including many courts) over a very long period 
o f time have tended to confuse two classes o f future interests: 
possibilities o f reverter and reversions (particularly, in the latter
19 (1890), 44 Ch.D. 85.
20 See Megarry, A Manual o f  the Law o f  Real Property (2nd ed., 1955), pp. 
144-145.
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case, with reversions attached to contingent remainders). It is with 
the possibility o f reverter that we must concern ourselves here for 
a few moments., This is the interest remaining in a grantor o f a fee 
simple determinable. In the conveyance by O to A and heirs so 
long as the property is used for school purposes, A has a fee simple 
determinable, and to take care o f the event happening o f non-user,
O has the possibility o f reverter. W hether this is a contingent o r 
vested interest in O has also been the subject o f debate for a con­
siderable period. It has been the opinion o f the writer that it is a 
vested interest (the condition precedent to O ’s getting the use o f  the 
interest again is only so attached and not to the estate itself; or, to 
put it another way, O had a fee simple absolute, he has given away 
a fee simple determinable and he therefore must have something 
left; this slice o f the orange is the possibility o f reverter; there are 
no strings attached to retention only to enjoyment). The question 
o f alienability o f the possibility o f reverter, inter vivos, was settled 
in New Brunswick some years ago. Section 14 o f the Property Act 
provides that such an  interest may be “ disposed o f by deed” . As 
well, the interest is devisable under section 2 o f the Wills Act. This 
leaves only the case o f devolution upon intestacy and here lies the 
potential problem. If the writer’s thesis above that the possibility 
o f reverter is a vested interest is not accepted then the problem 
becomes more acute for section 3 o f the Devolution o f Estates 
Act21 provides only for devolution o f estates “ vested in any person” . 
Perhaps a reference to a recent Canadian case will shed some light. 
In Re Tilbury West Public School Board and Hastie,22 the O ntario 
High C ourt held that a grant to certain persons “as long as the 
land shall be used and needed for school purposes” created a fee 
simple determinable in the grantees and left a possibility o f reverter 
in the grantor. For our purposes this fairly com m on form o f con­
veyance is im portant for the C ourt was asked to decide, once the 
categorization had been done, on the effect o f the Rule against 
Perpetuities on these estates. In holding that the possibility of 
reverter did not violate the Rule against Perpetuities, the Court 
relied on the interest in the grantor being vested 23 A succession of 
English cases had held the opposite24 and the m atter had been in 
some doubt in C anada.25 G etting back to our immediate problem 
then, o f whether under our Devolution of Estates Act, a possibility 
o f reverter descends under section 3, it would appear that if this
21 R.S.N.S., 1952, c. 62, s. 3.
22 (1966), 55 D .L.R . (2d) 407.
23 . .  the right o f  reverter existed in the grantor and was vested in him from 
and after the date o f execution o f the deed” . Ibid., at p. 416.
24 These are pretty well all cited in the above case.
25 Laskin, supra, note 11, at p. 52.
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O ntario case has persuasive value—as, it is submitted, it should— 
then all three possible areas o f transmission o f this interest have 
been covered. The only probable question remains as to whether 
this should be the case. In this connection, it is interesting to note 
that while agreeing with the thesis that a  possibility o f reverter is 
a vested interest and would not therefore fall under the Rule against 
Perpetuities, the Ontario Law Reform Commission has recom­
mended that the interest should be subject to the Rule and they 
further recommend legislation to ensure that this is done. It is 
hard to imagine this being accomplished w ithout destroying the 
significance of the possibility o f reverter being vested interest and 
it would have to be concluded, therefore, that once accomplished 
the vesting would have to go. This type o f legislative step would 
then have repercussions on the case of devolution upon intestacy 
under the Devolution of Estates Act. Aside from this rather tangen­
tial investigation pointing out a possible path for us to follow, it 
also clearly illustrates the latent danger in patching one area o f  
the fabric o f this highly integrated system of rules w ithout first 
closely looking at the others. It is recommended therefore that a t 
the moment no change need be considered in our statutory rules 
regarding this class o f future interest but that future recom m enda­
tions need be watched very carefully.
Switching now from the Property Act itself, but still remaining 
within the area of real property and the legislation presently extant 
appertaining thereto, it might be worthwhile to glance shortly at 
two other New Brunswick statutes that will bear some dissection.
The New Brunswick Dower Act26 still partially controls the law 
of conveyancing to a considerable extent and what hazards o f this 
nature are not placed on a conveyance by the Act are done so by 
the rules o f dower at common law.27 While it may not be politically 
healthy to repeal the Dower Act and also abolish the common 
law o f dower, there is no question but that dower is today an 
anachronism. The com bination o f testator’s family maintenance 
Acts, intestacy legislation, wills Acts and alm ost complete bar of 
dower provisions has swept past and obviated this ancient protection. 
We have made the move on curtesy28 and it is submitted that dower 
should follow. It served a much earlier era; it no longer serves today. 
Rather it hinders free conveyancing and its supposed protection 
can be fairly easily circumvented in the somewhat rare case o f 
potential use. The use o f the power o f appointm ent, a conveyance
26 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 64.
27 The Common Law rules o f dower still having considerable vitality; see 
section 3 o f the Dower Act. The Act really only enlarges the application 
by extending the concept to equitable interests and rights o f  entry.
28 Married Women’s Property Act, R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 140, s. 8.
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to uses, a conveyance o f the equity o f redemption by the husband 
alone are only a few o f the accepted devices.
Be all that as it may however, we will presumably keep dower 
in our arm oury for some time yet. If this is so, perhaps one o r two 
questions about it as it now exists may be asked. First o f all, the 
problem might arise o f interpretation o f a provision o f section 5. 
The provision here is that “ when a wife has been divorced by her 
husband . . .  by reason o f adultery by her committed, she shall not 
be entitled to dower out o f any lands o f her husband . .  This is 
no doubt straightforward but raises the obvious question o f what 
happens if the divorce is obtained by the wife? Presumably, the 
common law will apply. And the common law was clear: “ . . . divorce 
barred all marital rights o f both parties without regard to the loca­
tion o f fault” 29. The trouble lies in the spelling out o f the loss o f 
rights by the wife in section 5 o f the Dower Act and thus by implica­
tion in effect saying th a t if the divorce was obtained by the wife then 
her oower will be preserved. If this is not the result then it would 
appear that the provision o f section 5 is redundant. It could be 
suggested then that, if thought desirable, section 5 should be amended 
so as to cover both sides o f the coin. The reference in the opening 
words of section 5 to section 10 of an Act o f George III and to sec­
tion 37 o f the Divorce C ourt Act is extremely interesting in this 
regard and if one refers to section 10 as mentioned becomes more so.
It should also be pointed out that it might be worth considering 
a provision regarding dower and conveyancing from the Province 
o f Ontario. The Dower Act of O ntario30 provides that when a 
husband who is living apart from his wife seeks to sell property 
and encounters bar o f dower difficulties he may apply to a judge 
o f the Supreme o r County Court for an order dispensing with her 
concurrence in the deed. Once this is accomplished, the judge 
ascertains the am ount o f the wife’s dower and orders it paid into 
court. It would appear that such a provision would close what 
appears to be the only gap remaining in this aspect o f conveyancing; 
the submission is still advanced however, that dower should alto­
gether disappear.
Finally, one o f the most vexing problems facing solicitors today, 
and which has been so for a very long time, is that o f title searching 
and certification o f title. There is no doubt that a land titles system 
is, while perhaps not a panacea for all these legal ills, the most 
efficacious approach known today. Apathy and expense are its 
obstacles but presumably it will come into being someday. C on­
sideration has no doubt been given to such a system and its many
29 Powell on Rea! Property (1950), Vol. 2, s. 216.
30 R.S.O., 1960, s. 13.
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variants for New Brunswick and it is really not the burden o f this 
article to  push the case any further o ther than to recognize the need, 
not only from a theoretical point o f view, but from the practical 
side as well. Space is at a premium and time more so. The introduc­
tion o f a survey system based on a grid coupled with a land bank 
makes a new registry o f title system not only easier but almost 
mandatory. It is time we gave serious thought to it; until we do it 
might not be amiss to provide an intermediate palliative. We are 
all aware o f the process o f title search under our present set-up: 
taking the chain back to a good root (how far this is varies consider­
ably from office to office and location to location) based on crown 
grant o r some other more recent episode. It is the practice ,n Nova 
Scotia to  go back at least forty years to a good root and it ;s from 
this that it is submitted we might take our key. Any selection of 
minimum time is necessarily based on some provision o f a statute 
o f limitations, and a glance at the English solution will perhaps add 
a measure o f assistance. It had been held in England, at least since 
the beginning o f the nineteenth century,31 that on searching title 
all one needed to do was go back in time to a good root at least 
sixty years before. This sprang from the judicial ruling that possession 
by a grantor for this period prior to  a contract to sell was sufficient 
for all practical purposes to provide prima facie  evidence o f the right 
to convey.32 This assum ption was reduced to forty years in 187433 
and to thirty years in 1925,34 both by statute. As the majority o f our 
limitation periods, as established by statute, have as their base 
either a twenty or a forty year period then forty years is an appro­
priate figure to settle on at this juncture. If one were to do this 
then it might be practicable to establish, by statute, a system whereby 
it is stated that any registered conveyance o f the fee simple by way 
o f grant o r legal mortgage at least forty years before the date of 
the search is a good root o f title and that once that is found, a 
bringing forward o f the search to the present time is all that is 
required so far as certifying title is concerned from the evidence 
provided by the registry office and other public records. A view 
will o f course have to be taken as well to displace any fear o f title 
by adverse possession o r prescription.
This kind o f first aid is not really healthy o f course and it bears 
repeating that we can not really afford to continue on our present 
course. It would be satisfying to all (eventually, at least) to have a 
land titles system whether it be as sophisticated as to provide for 
a central registry or not. This kind o f cure can be done on a basis
31 Barnwell v. Harris (1809), 1 Taunt. 430.
32 See Cheshire, Modern Law o f  Real Property (10th ed., 1967), p. 659.
33 Vendor and Purcba. er Act (1874), 37 & 38 Viet., c. 78, s. 1 (Imp.).
34 Law o f Property Act (1925), 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 44 (1) (Imp.).
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whereby no great expense is involved all at once as is the case with 
an overnight creation o f a Torrens system. Rather, it is possible, 
once the survey work (already under way in New Brunswick) is 
complete, to gradually wend our way into it by a system whereby 
as each piece o f surveyed property comes up for lease, sale or 
mortgage it is investigated, surveyed, classified and certified. There 
is really no need for doing that piece o f property any earlier and the 
gradual m anner o f proceeding removes the sting o f expense and time. 
This is another of those areas o f law reform which needs a great 
deal o f prior working out and if a few forward looking practitioners 
were prepared to advise the government on its im plem entation then 
the job  could be done in its most effective manner. It is the practicing 
solicitor who needs the help in this area ; he is the most knowledgable 
from having done and indeed doing the work o f title searching; and 
it is he who will ultimately be able not only to improve his own 
position but materially aid his client as well.
It will be obvious to anyone who has lasted this long that I 
have omitted to mention one of the most necessary reforms we have 
facing us today and that is the problem of what is to be done with 
the Rule against Perpetuities. Such a topic is however really beyond 
the scope o f a simple article as this and is such a pervasive and 
difficult topic that it requires intense study on its own. The Province 
of O ntario has concluded such a study and reference to their report 
is thought sufficient for anyone interested in this area to begin with. 
It is a highly specialized field and obviously one of extreme im port­
ance not limited necessarily to the real property sphere. We in this 
province need reform in the application of the Rule as badly as 
anyone else; without a law reform commission or similar body it 
is a formidable and unenviable task.
In conclusion therefore may the writer respectfully suggest that 
the changes in our legislation mentioned in this article are long 
overdue; there are many others in this field as o f course in others.
I don’t seriously suggest that a great many people are really all that 
much interested in this facet o f law; a large number are in the 
many areas o f law, particularly on the legislative side, that need 
reconstruction. We are long overdue for a revision o f the New 
Brunswick statutes; perhaps consideration could be given to reflec­
tion in a new revision o f what should be done to modernize the 
laws of real property along with the necessary reforms in the other 
parts o f our legal system.
